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F I L E 
San Francisco County Sup.n 
FES 282014 
CLE~~~~~RT 
BY: _ Deputy Clerk 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
LUCY RODRIGUEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INSTAGRAM, LLC, 
Defendant. 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
Case No. CGC - 13-532875 
ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER 
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 
Plaintiff Lucy Rodriguez brought this putative class action against Instagram, LLC 
alleging causes of action for (1) breach of contract predicated on a violation of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; and (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 
17200 (UCL). 
I heard argument on Instagram's demurrer this date. 
Background 
Instagram is a web-based photograph sharing platform. Complaint, ~ 1. The service is 
free to users. When Instagram was launched in October 2010, its use was governed by its 
Original Terms of Use. Id. at ~ 2, Ex. A (Original Terms). The Original Terms governed until 
January 19, 20l3, at which date Instagram's New Terms of Use went into effect. Id. at ~~ 1-2, 
26, Ex. B (New Terms). On December 18,2012, a month earlier, Instagram's users were given 
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notice ofthe New Terms and their effective date. ld. at ~ 2, 28. The New Terms were modified 
on December 20, 2012, but the effective date was unchanged. ld. at ~ 26. 
The New Terms modified the original terms in three allegedly material respects: (1) in 
the Original Terms, Instagram disclaimed any ownership rights in content users post on 
Instagram, whereas in the New Terms Instagram disclaimed ownership of content users post on 
Instagram; I (2) in the Original Terms, Instagram was afforded a non-exclusive limited license to 
use, modify, delete from, add to, publicly perform, publicly display, reproduce, and translate 
content users posted on Instagram, whereas under the New Terms Instagram has a transferable 
and sub-licensable license to use the content users post, with the two allegedly material aspects 
being (1) the addition of sublicensing authority; and (2) removal of any limitations on the scope 
ofthe license and (3) the New Terms add a liability waiver. ld. at ~~ 3, 26. 
The New Terms provide that a user accepts them by continuing to use Instagram, that is, 
using the service on or after January 19, 2013. ld. at Ex. B. Under the New Terms, a user who 
does not agree to the terms must stop using Instagram. ld. 
Even if a user does not agree to the New Terms and deletes her account, Instagram does 
not purge the user's content. ld. at ~~ 7-8, 27. In its databases, Instagram does not distinguish 
between content that was uploaded before and after the New Terms went into effect. ld. at ~ 8. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff concludes that Instagram "de facto" asserts that the New Terms apply to 
all content users uploaded to Instagram, specifically including content uploaded before notice of 
the New Terms, regardless of whether a user agrees or not to the New Terms. ld. 
Plaintiff used Instagram under the Original Terms, and uploaded pictures, including 
pictures of herself. ld. at ~~ 2, 14. Plaintiff uses the material posted on Instagram for personal, 
1 Plaintiff suggests that use of the word "in" in the Original Terms disclaimed any ownership right in the content. 
whereas use of the word "of' in the New Terms disclaimed only complete ownership of the content. 
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business, and promotional purposes. Id. at ~ 14. As plainly suggested by the Complaint and 
clarified at today's hearing on demurrer, Plaintiff continued to use Instagram after the New 
Terms went into effect. Id. She was alerted to the New Terms, opted out of the arbitration 
provisions in the New Terms (Complaint ~ 16), filed a complaint in federal court immediately 
after learning of the New Terms, and thereafter to continued to use Instagram. 
Based on the language in the New Terms and a December 18,2012 press release in 
which Instagrarn described its advertising plan, Plaintiff believes that Instagrarn is negotiating 
and/or has executed with contracts with advertisers and/or other third parties to transfer and/or 
sublicense Plaintiff s content for the purposes of advertising, or otherwise has imminent plans to 
enter into such agreements. Id. at ~ 30. 
Instagram demurs, arguing (I) it acted within the scope of its contractual authority by 
modifying the terms; (2) the face of the New Terms demonstrates that Plaintiff could have 
declined to be bound by them by deleting her Instagrarn account after receiving notice of the 
New Terms but before they went into effect; and (3) Plaintiff has not adequately alleged harm. 
Discussion 
The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
1. Background Law 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement." Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development 
California, Inc., 2 Cal.4th 342,371 (1992). "The covenant of good faith finds particular 
application in situations where one party is invested with a discretionary power affecting the 
rights of another. Such power must be exercised in good faith." Carma, 2 Cal.4th at 372. 
"[T]he scope of conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the 
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purposes and express terms of the contract." Id. at 373. The covenant is read into contracts to 
protect the express promises of the contract. Id. In general, implied terms should never be read 
to vary express terms. Id. at 374. No covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be implied to 
forbid acts and conduct authorized by the express provisions of the contract. Id. The question of 
whether the implied covenant has been breached is ordinarily a question of fact unless only one 
inference can be drawn from the evidence. Hicks v. E. T. Legg & Associates, 89 Cal.App.4th 
496, 509 (2001). 
2. Badie 
Plaintiff apparently contends that Instagram breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing applicable to the Original Terms. Complaint, 'iI'iI 40-41 (Plaintiff is allegedly subject to 
Original Terms). These terms include this: 
We reserve the right to alter these Terms of Use at any time. If the alterations constitute 
a material change to the Terms of Use, we will notify you via internet mail according to 
the preference expressed on your account. What constitutes a 'material change' will be 
determined at our sole discretion, in good faith and using common sense and reasonable 
judgment. 
Id. at Ex. A (General Conditions, 'il2). 
The parties focus on Badie v. Bank of America, 67 Cal.App.4th 779 (1998). In Badie, the 
defendant Bank added an alternate dispute resolution clause to existing account agreements 
between itself and credit card customers through bill stuffers accompanying the monthly account 
statements pursuant to a change of terms provision in the original account agreements. 67 
Cal.App.4th at 783-84. The Bank argued that it could modify the contract without contractual 
formalities so long as it did so in accordance with the change of terms provision. Id. at 781. 
The Court rejected the argument, holding one may not exercise a unilateral right to 
modify a contract when it actually "attempts to recapture a foregone opportunity by adding an 
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entirely new term which has no bearing on any subject, issue, right, or obligation addressed in 
the original contract and was not within the reasonably contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was entered into." Id. at 796. The Bank's attempt to modify the contract thus breached 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The Court also concluded that the customers did not unambiguously waive their right to a 
jury trial by failing to stop or close the account immediately after receiving the notice, because 
the notice there was not designed to achieve knowing consent to the new provision in that they 
did not contain the type of clear language necessary to alert the recipient that she was waiving an 
important constitutional right. Id. at 805. 
To invoke Eadie, Plaintiff notes that Instagrarn imposed the New Terms pursuant to its 
authority under the Original Terms. But as some federal courts (applying California law) have 
noted, Eadie is distinguishable where there is an opportunity to opt out before new terms go into 
effect. 2 In this case, the New Terms expressly provide that use ofInstagram after the effective 
date, January 19,2013, constitutes acceptance of the New Terms. Complaint, Ex. B. The New 
Terms explain: "If you do not agree to be bound by all ofthese Terms of Use, do not access or 
use the Service." Id. 
Eadie is distinguishable here too. As the Complaint and argument today made clear, 
Plaintiff had a full and perfectly reasonable opportunity to read, and did read, the New Terms; 
she could have declined the revised agreement. She could have, under the plain language of the 
2 Ackerberg v Citicorp USA, Inc., 898 F. Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Illston, 1.) (plaintiff was given an 
opportunity to walk away from her credit card agreement when it was modified to include an arbitration clause in 
2003 but continued to use the card until 2011, evidencing her acceptance of the terms; distinguishing Badie because 
in Bodie there was no realistic opportunity to exit the account): Cayanan v. Citi Holdings, Inc., 928 F.Supp.2d 1182, 
1199-1200 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (reasoning that bill stuffer notices are not inherently invalid method of obtaining assent 
to changes in credit card contracts and finding that the credit card user had assented to an arbitration agreement 
contained in a bill stuffer where the bill stuffer notified the user that the agreement was binding unless the user 
closed his account within 30 days and refrained from using and authorizing the card and the user continued to use 
the card; following Ackerberg in distinguishing Bodie). 
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New Terms, avoided the New Terms if she stopped using the service, but she continued to use it: 
Plaintiff alleged that she used Instagram at all relevant times, including after the New Terms 
went into effect. Complaint, ~ 14. Thus Plaintiff must have consented to the New Terms. Thus 
there is no Eadie issue, because the allegation in the Complaint demonstrate that Plaintiff entered 
into a new agreement. 
At argument, Plaintiffs counsel both agreed that Plaintiff agreed to the New Terms, and 
that by filing the federal complaint, she had not. No other basis was provided on which one 
might conclude that Plaintiff had not agreed to the New Terms. But there is also no basis to 
conclude that the filing of a complaint is sufficient to reject the New Terms-most especially 
after Plaintiff continues to use and presumably benefit from the Instagram site. 
It does not help to say, as Plaintiff does, that Instagram treats content uploaded under the 
Original Terms as if it were uploaded under the New Terms anyway. Complaint, ~~ 7-8,42; 
Opposition, 9. Perhaps Instagram might breach the Original Terms (e.g. ifit sub-licenses content 
of users who never agreed to the New Terms). But Plaintiff does not allege that breach of the 
Original Terms. The question here is whether Instagram breached the Original Tenns by 
imposing the New Terms. See Complaint, ~'140-43. 
True, Plaintiff does suggest that because the formerly uploaded content "persists" on 
Instagram's systems (or is not "purged," Complaint '127), the content of necessity will be 
exploited pursuant to the New Terms. But as Plaintiffs counsel agreed at today's hearing, such 
'persistence' is both consistent with treatment under the Old Terms (which do not promise not to 
keep the content) and of course is consistent with the New Terms, to which Plaintiff agreed. 
Allegations of such persistence do not support an allegation of breach of any terms. 
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3. Harm 
Instagram contends that Plaintiffs breach of the implied covenant theory is also barred 
because she has not alleged harm arising out of the breach. Plaintiff argues that she has alleged 
diminished property rights, and that in any event actual damages are not necessary to state a 
claim for breach of contract. Opposition, 7-8. 
Damages are an essential element for a breach of contract claim. See Troyk v. Farmers 
Group, Inc., 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1352 (2009); Acoustics Inc. v. Trepte Construction Co., 14 
Cal.App.3d 887, 913 (1971); CACI No. 303 (2013). A breach of the implied covenant is 
necessarily a breach of contract. Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC, 
194 Cal.App.4th 873, 885 (2011). The damages element is the same. Compare CACI No. 303 
(breach of contract element 5: "That [name of plaintiff] was harmed by that failure"); CACI No. 
325 (breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing element 5: "That [name of plaintiff] was 
harmed by [name of defendant], s conduct"). 
The alleged harm arises from Instagram's asserted "imminent plans" to sublicense 
Plaintiffs pictures or other content she posted. Complaint, ~ 30. This is not harm if Plaintiff 
agreed to the New Terms. And under the allegations of the Complaint, she did. 
C. VeL 
A VCL claim may be brought "by a person who has suffered injury in fact and lost 
money or property as a result of the urrfair competition." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. Therefore, 
to establish standing, a VCL plaintiff must "(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or 
property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the 
economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the urrfair business practice ... that is the 
gravamen ofthe claim." Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 CaI.4th 310, 322 (2011). 
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The UCL prohibits "unfair competition," which is defined as any "unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 
An "unlawful" business act or practice may be established by alleging facts sufficient to 
show a violation of some underlying law. See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles 
Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (1999) (UCL extends to anything that can properly 
be called a business practice that at the same time is forbidden by law). A "fraudulent 
that (1) Instagram began operating its service under the Original Terms stating that it did not 
claim any ownership rights in content users post using its service, taking for itself only a 
"limited" license to use, etc., the content; and (2) Instagram unilaterally expanded the scope of its 
license, and granted itself sub-licensing power, with respect to photographs uploaded under the 
Original Terms when it imposed the New Terms. Id.; Complaint, ~~ 48-50, 52. 
The legal theory here is no better than that under the contract claim. Effective January 
19,2013, use ofInstagram constituted acceptance of the New Terms by express provision of the 
New Terms. Complaint, Ex. B. Accordingly, Instagram did not unilaterally grant itself sub-
licensing power; rather, it required Plaintiffto consent to sub-licensing power, a liability waiver, 
and other terms, under a new agreement, if she wished to continue using Instagram' s service. 3 
She did not have to agree to these terms, but the Complaint makes it clear that she did. 
As to her unlawful claim, it should be rejected because it relies on the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, for reasons discussed above. See Complaint, ~ 48. Plaintiff also alleged 
that Instagram should be estopped from changing its terms of use in the way it did. Id. (Plaintiff 
did not argue estoppel in her Opposition.) But, as Instagram notes, Plaintiff could not possibly 
3 As with the implied covenant claim, Plaintiff alleges that application of the New Tenus was unavoidable because 
Instagram would treat content posted by users who rejected the New Tenus as if they had agreed to the New Tenns. 
Complaint, 1\ 53. If Plaintiff had rejected the New Tenus, she may well have grounds to complain about such 
conduct in violation of the Original Tenus. But she agreed to the New Tenns. 
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have had a reasonable expectation of perpetual use of Instagram' s service under the Original 
Terms, in which Instagram expressly claimed the right to modifY the terms on notice or terminate 
service for any reason without notice. See Complaint, Ex. A. 
Conclusion 
F or the foregoing reasons, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. 
Dated: February 28,2014 
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Curtis E.A. Karnow 
Judge Of The Superior Court 
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